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A Supermarket-Level Analysis of Demand for Breakfast 
Cereals: A Random Coefficients Approach 
 
1. Introduction 
Demand analysis constitutes a cornerstone in the analysis of the industry and 
consumer behavior. Unlike the demand for homogeneous products, the demand for 
differentiated products presents two challenges: the dimensionality problem and the 
consumer heterogeneity issue. Due to differentiation, the number of brands is too large 
(for instance, in ready-to-eat cereal industry there 200 different brands) making the 
classical methods of demand such as the Linear Expenditure (Stone, 1954), the 
Rotterdam (Thail, 1965; and Barten 1966), the Translog (Christensen, Jorgensen and Lau, 
1975), and the Almost Ideal Demand System models (Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980) 
practically impossible to implement without assuming a restricted pattern of substitution. 
Furthermore, these methods ignore the consumer heterogeneity issue, which offers the 
basis for marketing segmentation, targeting and positioning, as well as micro marketing 
(Kamakura et al., 1996). 
To solve the dimensionality problem, Spence (1976) and Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) 
proposed the constant elasticity of substitution (CES) utility function where the 
dimensionality problem is solved by imposing symmetry between different brands, which 
implies the estimation of a single parameter regardless of the number of brands. This 
strong restriction implies that the cross-price elasticities are equal, thus leading to 
inappropriate conclusions. Another approach to solve the dimensionality problem is to 
divide the brands into smaller categories and use a flexible functional form to estimate 
  2the demand within each category, thus reducing the number of parameters to be estimated 
(Hausman, Leonard, and Zona (1994), Cotterill (1994), Hausman (1996), and Ma 
(1997))
1. The problem with this approach resides in the difficulty of an arbitrary division 
across categories. For instance, Hausman (1996) uses only three categories (adult, kid, 
and family) while Cotterill (1994) and Ma (1997) use four categories (all family, taste 
enhanced wholesome, simple health, and kid cereal). 
For the consumer heterogeneity issue, most recent advances have been in the area 
of marketing (For a summary of a selected number of studies including consumer 
heterogeneity, see Leszczyc and Bass (1998)). Ignoring consumer heterogeneity in 
studying consumer brand processes may lead to biased results and hence inaccurate 
inferences regarding marketing strategies (Segmentation, positioning, targeting and micro 
marketing). 
This paper applies the Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (BLP, 1995) discrete choice 
procedure developed by McFadden (1973, 1981, and 1984) to estimate the demand for 37 
brands of ready-to-eat cereal (RTEC) at the supermarket chain level in Boston area. The 
dimensionality problem is solved by projecting the consumer choices onto a set of brand 
characteristics giving smaller dimension than the number of brands. The product and 
consumer heterogeneity are taken into account by the use of random coefficients discrete 
choice models (Cardell, 1989; Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes, 1995, Nevo 2000), which 
offer the advantage to solve the problems of substitution pattern implied, by the use of 
classical discrete choice models such as the Logit, the Probit, and the Nested Logit. The 
                                                 
1 Hausman, Leonard, and Zona (1994) and Hausman (1996) divide the demand estimation problem in three 
stages: the first stage concerns the demand for the product (RTEC), the second stage corresponds to 
different categories (kids, adults, family cereals) and the last stage analyzes the demand for different brands 
within each category. 
  3main contribution of this paper is that it is the first study to estimate a discrete choice 
andom coefficients demand system for branded products at the chain as opposed to 
market level
2. Unlike the previous works, the level of desegregation is such that one is 
able to estimate the demand for RTEC brands at the supermarkets level, hence combining 
the brands and supermarkets choices, and approximating the relevant levels of 
competition in the real world. Nevo (2000), for instance, used brand at the city level, 
sidestepping the importance of supermarkets. 
The level of desegregation is such that one is able to estimate the demand for 
RTEC brands at the supermarkets level, hence combining the brands and supermarkets 
choices. It also study uses four-week data while prior brand demand analysis uses 
quarterly (Nevo (2001); Hausman et al. (1994)) or weekly (Kadiyali et al. (1999); 
Cotterill (1994)) observations
3.  
2. A Model with Product and Consumer Heterogeneity 
This section presents a general model of demand that takes into account the 
product differentiation and the consumer heterogeneity. The general intuition is that the 
consumer chooses the brand that maximizes its utility. The choice is driven by the brand 
characteristics and the consumer characteristics. While some of the consumer and brand 
characteristics are observable (to the researcher), other characteristics are not. Consumers 
with different observed and unobserved characteristics make different choices. The 
indirect utility
4 of consumer i from buying the brand j is given by 
                                                 
2 Cotterill and Dhar (2002) is the only prior chain level demand study and it uses a nested logit model.   
3 There is no consensus concerning which time unit is desirable. Quarterly may be too aggregate, while 
weekly may be too disaggregate to measure strategic pricing moves in a static equilibrium model. 
4 The indirect utility comes from a quasi-linear utility function. 
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where  j β represents the store/brand fixed effects,  are the observed product 
characteristics of brand j,  is the price of the brand  , 
j x
j p j j ζ are the unobserved (by the 
econometrician) product characteristics, and  j i ε represents the distribution of consumer 
preferences about the unobserved product characteristics, with a density  ) (ε f . The 
parameters to be estimated are  i α and i β . Note that those parameters are allowed to vary 
across consumers, therefore taking into account the heterogeneity taste of consumer. 
These coefficients can be decomposed into a fixed component and a variable 
component (changing with consumers’ observed and unobserved characteristics). This 
decomposition can be expressed as: 
i i i v D γ λ α α + + =          ( 2 )  
i i i v D ρ ϕ β β + + =          ( 3 )  
where the  represents the consumers’ observed characteristics such as demographics 




Substituting (2) and (3) in (1) yields 
ij j j i j i j j i j i j j ij p v p D p x v x D x U ε ζ γ λ α γ λ β β + + − − − + + + =                (4) 
Unobserved consumer characteristics   are assumed to be normally 
distributed , where I is the identity matrix; and the observed consumer 
characteristics  have an empirical distribution , not necessarily a normal 
distribution, from the demographic data. 
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  5  The indirect utility given in equation (4) can be decomposed into two parts: a 
mean utility given by j j j j j p x ζ α β β δ + − + =  and a deviation from that mean, which is 
a function of the interaction between the observed and unobserved consumer’s 
characteristics and the price and observed brand characteristics, given by 
ij j i j i j i j i ij p v x v p D x D ε γ γ λ λ µ + − + − = .       ( 5 )  
To complete the model, an outside good is included to give the consumer the 
possibility not to buy any one of the J brands included in the choice set
5. The utility of 
the outside good is normalized to be constant over time and equal zero. For the case at 
hand, the outside good can include all other brands, or the residual brands not included in 
the study.  
Given the observed and unobserved consumer characteristics define the set of 
choice by  
, } ,... 1 , 0 : ) , , {( ) ; , , ( N k U U v D p x S ik ijt ij i i j j j j = ∀ ≥ = ε θ ζ     (6) 
where θ is a vector that includes all the parameters of the model. 
  The consumer purchases the brand that gives the highest utility. The market share 
of the  brand corresponds to the probability the  brand is chosen. That is,   jth jth
). ( ) ( ) ( } ,... 1 , 0 : ) , , {( ε ε dF v dG D dH N k U U v D I s ik ij ij i i j ∫ = ∀ ≥ =      (7) 
Depending on the assumptions regarding , and v D, ε , the integral in (7) can have 
or not a closed formula. In a general setting, the integral in (7) does not have a closed 
formula and should be solved numerically (BLP, 1995; Nevo, 2000). 
Using (7), the price elasticities of the market shares are 
                                                 
5 The inclusion of the outside good is necessary in order to accomplish with the exhaustiveness of 
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In this setting, each consumer can have different price elasticity for each 
individual brand. The substitution patterns are not constrained by a priori segmentation of 
the market. If, for example, the price of a brand increases consumers are more likely to 
switch to brands with similar characteristics, rather than to the most popular brand. Also 
individual with similar characteristics will tend to have similar purchasing patterns. 
3. Model Estimation 
  The estimation proceeds by computing the integral in (7), either analytically or 
numerically. Different models can be implemented depending on the assumptions on the 
distribution of the unobserved consumer characteristics. When consumer heterogeneity is 
integrated in the random shock j i ε , the integral in (7) can be solved analytically. In the 
case  j i ε is distributed i.i.d. with a Type I extreme value distribution, the solution of (7) 
yields the Multinomial Logit model, henceforth the Logit model. 
3.1. The Multinomial Logit Model 
  The simplest case is to assume that consumer heterogeneity enters only through 
the error term  j i ε  In this case, there are not random coefficients since the parameters 
i α and i β  are not varying across consumers. Under this assumption equation (4) becomes 
. ij j j j j ij p x U ε ζ α β β + + − + =         ( 9 )  
Further assume that  j i ε is distributed i.i.d. with a type I extreme value distribution, i.e., 
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Equation (10) corresponds to the Logit model. This model presents the advantage to be 
simple to implement. The estimation of its parameters is based on the inversion proposed 
by Berry, Levisohn and Pakes (BLP, 1995) given by 
j j j j j j p x s s ζ α β β δ + − + = − = ) ln( ) ln( 0 ,                        (11) 
where  is the market share of the outside good, obtained by subtracting the sum of 
observed market shares of all the inside brands from 1. Note that the logit model is 
transformed to a simple linear regression where the natural logarithm of the ratio between 
the observed market shares inside good with respect to outside good is regressed on 
product characteristics and the price variables. 
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  Equation (12) poses two problems. The first problem is what is called 
independent from irrelevant alternatives (IIA) (McFadden, 1981; Train (2000)). Notice 
that the ratio of the logit market shares for any two brands j and k does not depend on any 
brands other than j and k. That is, the relative odds of market shares of brand j over brand 
k are the same no matter what other brands are available or what the characteristics of the 
other brands are. 
  8  While the IIA property is appropriate in some cases, it is very restrictive in many 
cases. For instance consider the case of two RTEC: a kids’ cereal (KA) and a family’s 
cereal (F) that have similar market shares. If the price of another kids’ cereal (KB) 
increases, the substitution from KB to F and from KB to KA will be the same. However, 
in real life, one would expect the substitution to take place across kids’ cereals only, i.e. 
from KB to KA. 
  The other problem is that the own-price elasticities are related to own prices. A 
lower price implies a lower elasticity, which may imply inaccurate measure of price-cost 
margins. The simplicity of the Logit model gives the researcher an opportunity to test 
how well the data is behaving. However, due to its limitations, the Logit model should 
not be used to infer any type of conclusion regarding market structure or market power 
(Nevo, 2000). To do so, one needs a more elaborate model that circumvents the Logit 
model shortcomings. The random coefficients model constitutes a good candidate that, at 
least, provides a more flexible substitution pattern and own price elasticities. 
3.2. The Random Coefficients Model 
  This model is much more complicated than the Logit model since it allows for 
consumer heterogeneity  i α and i β  as described in (2) and (3), that is each consumer is 
different from another consumer in their response to price and brand characteristics. The 
Random Coefficients model (henceforth RCM) poses two challenges. First, the integral 
in equation (7) has no closed formula and should be solved numerically
6. Second, 
information on the distribution of demographics is needed to compute the individual 
market shares. 
                                                 
6 The integral in (7) is solved using the simulation technique proposed by Pakes (1986). 
  9 The solution of the integral in (7) is based on the choice of the parameters that 
minimize the distance between the predicted market shares given by equation (7) and the 
observed market shares. That is, 
, ) ; , , ( S p x s Min − θ δ
θ           ( 1 3 )  
 where  represents the market shares given by equation (7) and  are the observed 
market shares. However, this approach implies a costly non-linear minimization 
procedure because all the parameters enter (12) in a non-linear manner. 
(.) s S
  To avoid this difficulty, Berry (1994) suggests inverting the market share function 
giving the mean utility valuation δ that equates the predicted market shares with 
observed market shares . 2 . . ) ; ( S s = θ δ , where  2 θ (the notation is borrowed from Nevo 
(2000)) is a vector of parameters that enter the indirect utility function non-linearly. 
  Once the mean utility valuation δ is obtained the next step is to define the error 
term as the deviation from that mean. That is, 
). ( ) ; ( 2 . j j j j p x S α β θ δ ω + − =         ( 1 4 )  
Note that it is the observed and not the predicted market shares that enter the error term. 
The error term is then interacted with instruments to form an objective function to be 
minimized using the generalized methods of moments (GMM) estimation.  
4. Data Sources and Management 
  The data used in the above analysis consists of two kinds of variables: retail sales 
variables and demographic variables.  
The sales data were obtained from the Information Resource, Inc. (IRI) Infoscan 
database at the Food Policy Marketing Center of University of Connecticut. It covers 
RTEC sales for 37 brands at the four leading supermarkets in Boston (Stop & Shop, 
  10Shaw’s, DeMoulas and Star Market) for four-weekly periods between April 1995 and 
December 1997. One important feature of this period is that it covers significant price 
drops in the 1990s when the RTEC industry was being questioned on market power 
(Cotterill, 1999, and Connor, 1999). The sales data collected consists of the following 
variables: dollar sales, volume (in pounds) sales, and the percent volume sold with any 
feature. 
  From the RTEC sales data, the market shares and the retail prices were computed 
for each brand and supermarket. Market shares are obtained by converting volume sales 
into number of servings sold and dividing by the potential market size. This is done by 
using the serving weight found on the box of cereals. The potential market size is 
assumed to be one serving per capita and per day as in Nevo (2001). The real retail prices 
were computed by dividing the dollar sales of each brand by the number of servings sold 
and then deflated using the urban consumers CPI for Boston (with CPI=100 for 1981). 
  The analysis is conducted using a set of 37 RTEC brands produced by six 
manufacturers (Kellogg’s, General Mills, Post-Kraft, Quaker, Ralston and Nabisco) sold 
in four supermarket channels (Stop & Shop, Shaw’s, DeMoulas, Star market and all other 
chains) in Boston market from April 1995 to December 1997 for 6475 observations. 
  Primary data on product characteristics were collected by examining the cereal 
boxes. The variables collected were the content of calories, sugar, proteins, vitamins, 
minerals, sodium, potassium, fiber and total fat. The characteristics also included dummy 
variables for corn, oat, rice and fruits and a dummy variable for kids’ cereals. It is 
assumed that those characteristics did not change since between 1995 and 1997. Besides 
the sales data, the analysis uses the demographic data to take account of the heterogeneity 
  11of consumer taste. This paper uses two demographic variables: the natural logarithm of 
age and income. Further it is assumed that those variables are jointly normally distributed 
with mean given by the grocery data and variance-covariance matrix given by the CPS 
data at Boston level.
7
  The demand model presented above implies endogeneity of RTEC prices, and, 
hence, can lead to biased parameter estimates
8. This implies that prices are correlated 
with product characteristics. This study uses a set of instrumental variables to control for 
retail price endogeneity in a particular supermarket. The set has two subcomponents. The 
first one consists of the interaction between input prices and brand dummy variables, 
where input prices (wages in the Boston area and the price of gas, the price of industrial 
and commercial electricity at the location of manufacturers, the Federal Funds Effective 
interest rate, and the 3-month Commercial Paper interest rate) were interacted with brand 
dummy variables. The second subcomponent consists of time dummy variables 
describing the jawboning campaign events that induced price drops (change in conduct) 
by RTEC manufacturers, as described by Cotterill (1999) and Connor (1999).  
All the price instruments mentioned above were interacted with the error terms 
when applying the GMM estimation procedure. The use of GMM technique implies the 
need for an optimal weighting matrix. This paper follows Hansen (1982) who shows that 
setting the weighting matrix equal the inverse of an asymptotic covariance matrix is 
optimal in the sense that it gives parameter estimates with the smallest asymptotic 
variance.  
                                                 
7 Romeo (2005) shows that knowing the joint distribution for demographics at the city level is sufficient to 
infer the distribution at the county or zip code levels. 
8 This endogeneity comes from the fact that retail prices depend on observed and unobserved product 
characteristics. Any variation in those characteristics induces a variation in retail prices. 
  125. Empirical Results 
5.1. The Logit Demand 
  Table 1 presents the results of the regression of equation (11) ( ) on 
prices, promotion and product characteristics. The characteristics included are the content 
of calories, sugar, fiber and a dummy variable for kids’ cereals. 
) ln( ) ln( 0t jt s s −
The second column of Table 1 presents the results of the ordinary least squares 
(OLS) regression, while column 3 presents the instrumental variables (IV) results of a 
two-stage least squares regression. The OLS and IV results are mixed. Hence, as one 
would expect, the parameter estimates of the price, calories and sugar are negative, 
though the sugar parameter estimate is not significant. In the other hand, the promotion, 
fiber and kid dummy variable are not of the expected sign. For example, one would 
expect a positive effect of the fiber content and promotion on the market share of the 
RTEC brand. For the kid dummy variables, a possible explanation of the negative sign 
would be that given the high level of retail prices, household with kids tend to opt for 
other cheaper breakfast alternatives.  
Table 2 presents the own-price elasticities estimated from the Logit model as 
given in equation (11). As expected, all the own-price elasticities are negative with a 
magnitude greater than one in absolute value. This implies that at the supermarket level 
the demand for differentiated brands is elastic. The elasticities range from –7.6819 for 
Ralston Cookie Crisp in Star Market to –2.6032 for Kellogg’s Corn Flakes in Stop & 
Shop. Figure 1 shows the box plots for the own price elasticities for each supermarket. 
Note that the outlier in each supermarket is the Ralston Cookie Crisp. Figure 1 also 
shows that in average the elasticities are low in absolute value in Shaw’s compared to the 
  13other supermarkets, the Star Market being the most elastic. In the other hand, the analysis 
of the variance (Table 3) shows that the difference between own-price elasticities across 
supermarkets is statistically significant. 
Turning now to the cross-price elasticities, equation (12) shows that the cross-
price elasticity of the brand j with respect to brand k does not depend on brand j price or 
market shares, it only depends on the share and the price of brand k. This implies the 
same cross-price elasticity for all k. This means that a price increase for brand j will 
increase the market share of the other brands by the same percentage. This issue 
constitutes the biggest disadvantage of the logit model. 
5.2. The Random Coefficients Model Results 
  The advantage of the RCM is allowing for heterogeneity of tastes across 
consumers. The approach taken above will allow having a sort of measurement of the 
heterogeneity, which includes the influence of demographic variables (such as income 
and age) and also the effect of the unobserved consumer characteristics. The RCM model 
also remedies to the cross-price substitution problem posed by logit model. 
  The results of the estimation are presented in Table 3. The first set of parameter 
estimates (Means (β ’s)) gives the parameter that enter the indirect utility function 
linearly or the mean valuation utility. The second set gives the interaction between the 
unobserved consumer characteristics (random draws from a multivariate normal 
distribution) and the brand characteristics. The third and fourth set gives the interaction of 
the brand characteristics with the age and income variables, respectively. 
  The parameter estimates of the means of the distribution of the marginal utility 
(β ’s) or the mean valuation of utility are all significant and have expected signs except 
  14few. For the average consumer, the price has negative marginal utility, as one would 
expect. Similarly, the calories content has a negative effect on the mean valuation of the 
utility. The fiber coefficient is negative and significant, this result is consistent with 
Stanley Tschirthart (1991) but different from the finding of Nevo (2001). Stanley and 
Tschirthart attribute their finding to the taste component of fiber dominating the nutrition 
component, while Nevo attributes his finding to the nutrition component that dominates 
the taste component. For the average consumer, sugar has positive marginal utility; this is 
consistent with the finding of Stanley and Tschirthart (1991) and Nevo (2001). Notice 
also that the promotion coefficient is positive and significant, as one would expect that 
merchandising would increase the marginal utility of the brand. 
  The estimates of the interaction between the taste parameters and the unobserved 
consumer characteristics are mainly not significant except for sugar and the calories 
contents. It seems that the unobserved consumer characteristics react negatively with 
calories content while consumers approve, for some reason, the sugar content. A 
surprising and totally different from Nevo’s findings (2001) is that the interaction of the 
product attributes with age are not significant, making one to conclude that the age of the 
consumer is not an important when consumers make their decisions to by RTEC. The 
interactions with income are all significant in other hand.  
  The distribution of the individual price sensitivity is given in figure 3. The figure 
shows that the individual price coefficient is normally distributed. 
The implied own-price RCM elasticities are given in table 4. Compared to the 
logit-implied elasticities, the RCM elasticities are lower in absolute value; this pattern 
conforms to Nevo (2001) and Villas-Boas (2002). Regarding the magnitude of the 
  15elasticities, the elasticities of this paper are greater (in absolute value) to those found by 
Nevo (2001). However, the latter were at the city level while the present elasticities are at 
the supermarket level. Figure 4 gives the box plots of the own-price elasticities for each 
supermarket. The box plots show that in Shaw’s supermarkets RTEC brands show more 
inelastic behavior that in the other supermarket chains, with Star Market being the most 
elastic. The own-price elasticities in Shaw’s varies between –6.0686 for Ralston Cookie 
Crisp to –2.5697 for Kellogg’s Corn Flakes suggesting a margin varying between 16% 
and 39 %. For Stop & Shop, the own price elasticities vary between –6.8381 for Ralston 
Cookie Crisp to –2.4439 for Kellogg’s Corn Flakes. Notice also that in the four 
supermarket chains, Kellogg’s Corn Flakes, is the most inelastic, while the Ralston 
Cookie Crisp is the most elastic. Analysis of variance was conducted to see the effect of 
the retailers and the manufacturers on the level of elasticities. The results show that linear 
effects of those two factors are significant, while the interaction term is not significant, 
indicating a little evidence that the origin of the brand (manufacturer) has an effect on 
where the brand is sold. 
For the cross-price elasticities, due to the size of the data set it is impossible to 
present all the cross-price elasticities. In general, all the cross-price elasticities are 
positive and vary across brands as oppose to those implied by the logit model. To better 
interpret these elasticities, the brands are grouped in segments as in Cotterill (1994) and 
Ma (1997). Table 5 presents a sample of own- and cross-price elasticities in Stop $ Shop. 
For example, Kellogg’s Corn Flakes is more sensitive to a change in the price of GM 
Cheerios, also an all family brand, than to GM Lucky Charms, a kids cereal. Another 
pattern that is obvious from the table is that the Kellogg’s and GM brands are less 
  16sensitive to the brands from other manufacturers. The latter seem to be very sensitive to a 
change in the price of the leading brands, mainly GM Cheerios.  
Table 6 presents the implied cross-price elasticities for three manufacturers brands 
across supermarkets. The results show that for stop & shop, the leading supermarket 
chain, the brands are more sensitive to the change in price of the brands sold in their 
supermarkets. Interestingly, in the rest of the supermarket chains, the brands are mostly 
sensitive to the change in the price of the brands sold in Stop & Shop. For example, 
Kellogg’s Corn Flakes sold in Shaw’s is more sensitive to a change in the price of 
Kellogg’s Corn Flakes sold in Stop & Shop than the change in the price of GM Cheerios 
sold in Shaw’s. These substitution patterns are consistent across the table and show that 
for a given manufacturer brand, the Stop & Shop supermarket chain is the price leader for 
the RTECs in Boston. 
6. Conclusion 
  This paper used a random coefficients discrete choice approach to estimate 
the demand for RTECs at the top four supermarkets in Boston area. The empirical results 
provide a wealth of consumer behavior information, including own- and cross-price 
elasticites for 37 brands of RTECs at the four leading supermarkets in Boston. 
Consumers respond positively and strongly to promotion, negatively and strongly to 
price, calories and fiber, and weakly to sugar content. Income has a strong interactive 
effect with product characteristics and thus is a useful variable for market segmentation. 
In comparison, the results with the more commonly used Logit model indicate 
significantly lower price elasticities, provide a limited window on consumer behavior, 
and yield predicted brand and supermarket market shares that are quite divergent from 
  17observed values. Since the BLP approach, by construction, predicts market shares 
calibrated to observed ones, it also provides a preferred benchmark for consumer 
behavior and marketing decisions.  
The demand for RTECs is generally price elastic (ranging between -3 and -8). The 
substitution patterns given by the implied cross-price elasticities show that brands of 
RTEC are more sensitive to the brands that are in same segment/category than to the 
brands in other categories. At the manufacturer level, Post, Quaker, Nabisco and Ralston 
brands seem to be more sensitive to the leading manufacturers brands, mainly GM 
Cheerios. At the retail level, the results show that for a given manufacturer brand, Stop 
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  20Table 1 RTEC Demand in Boston: Logit Parameter Estimates. 
Variables OLS 
Estimates 





























Over Identification Test 





















  21Table 2. Logit Own-Price Elasticity Estimates for RTECs in Boston Supermarkets 
RTEC Brand  Stop & 
Shop 



















GMHoney Nut Cheerios 
GMKix 
GMLucky Charms 
GMMulti Gain Cheerios 
GMTotal 
GMTotal Raisin Bran 
GMWheaties 
GMApple Cinnamon  






Qcap N Crunch 
Qoat 
QToasted 
N Frosted Wheat Bites 
N Spoon Size 
R Cookie Crisp 
R Corn Chex 





























































































































































































  22Table 3. RTEC Demand: RCM Parameter Estimates. 
 Variable  Estimate  t-Statistic 















































































































  23Table 4. RCM Own-Price Elasticity Estimates for RTECs in Boston Supermarkets 
RTEC Brand  Stop & 
Shop 



















GMHoney Nut Cheerios 
GMKix 
GMLucky Charms 
GMMulti Gain Cheerios 
GMTotal 
GMTotal Raisin Bran 
GMWheaties 
GMApple Cinnamon  






Qcap N Crunch 
Qoat 
QToasted 
N Frosted Wheat Bites 
N Spoon Size 
R Cookie Crisp 
R Corn Chex 





























































































































































































  24Table 5 A Sample of Implied Cross-Price Elasticities in Stop $ Shop 
























K Corn Flakes  -2.4439 0.0265 0.0061 0.0160 0.0097 0.0084 0.0274 0.0108 0.0129 0.0132 0.0089 0.0120





















0.0588 0.0088 0.0220 0.0154 0.0107 0.0378 0.0155 0.0233 0.0191 0.0190 0.0196
 K Crispix  0.0211 0.0490 0.0090 0.0201 0.0138 0.0101 0.0379 0.0140 0.0223 0.0188 0.0165 0.0176
K Raisin Bran  0.0174 0.0376 0.0067 -3.0110 0.0443 0.0285 0.0297 0.0139 0.0184 0.0142 0.0112 0.0231
K Frosted Mini Wheats  0.0190 0.0507 0.0089 0.0470 0.0331 0.0205 0.0362 0.0156 0.0228 0.0180 0.0157 0.0220
K Special K  0.0201 0.0505 0.0089 0.0206 0.0142 0.0105 -4.8778 0.0140 0.0230 0.0187 0.0168 0.0181
K Frosted Flakes  0.0205 0.0354 0.0062 0.0286 0.0189 0.0147 0.0291 0.0133 0.0165 0.0142 0.0108 0.0198
K Froot Loops  0.0206 0.0510 0.0092 0.0201 0.0139 0.0100 0.0382 0.0140 0.0229 -4.6290 0.0188 0.0184
GM Cheerios  0.0149 -3.7578 0.0091 0.0198 0.0145 0.0093 0.0384 0.0158 0.0269 0.0194 0.0230 0.0204
GM Wheaties  0.0225 0.0400 0.0076 0.0214 0.0143 0.0107 0.0334 0.0132 0.0186 0.0161 0.0127 0.0159
GM Total Raisin Bran  0.0185 0.0351 0.0065 0.0549 0.0378 -3.9104 0.0303 0.0133 0.0183 0.0141 0.0102 0.0238
GM Total  0.0168 0.0599 0.0093 0.0221 0.0159 0.0111 0.0398 0.0145 -4.9320 0.0194 0.0190 0.0207
 GM Multi Grain Cheerios  0.0115 0.0835 0.0093 0.0215 0.0166 0.0106 0.0404 0.0157 0.0319 0.0204 0.0253 0.0248
GM Honey Nut Cheerios  0.0166 0.0493 0.0073 0.0284 0.0200 0.0143 0.0329 0.0145 0.0214 0.0156 0.0141 0.0226
GM Lucky Charms  0.0161 0.0490 0.0075 0.0292 0.0207 0.0150 0.0337 0.0144 0.0222 0.0170 0.0153 -4.6996
GM Kix  0.0145 0.0779 0.0101 0.0219 0.0161 0.0105 0.0414 0.0161 0.0300 0.0215 0.0249 0.0234
Post Garpe Nuts  0.0188 0.0472 0.0073 0.0222 0.0152 0.0107 0.0320 -2.7828 0.0192 0.0157 0.0149 0.0178
Post Raisin Bran  0.0157 0.0393 0.0066 0.0652 -3.1093 0.0293 0.0295 0.0140 0.0191 0.0140 0.0114 0.0244
N Frosted Wheat Bites  0.0164 0.0587 0.0098 0.0458 0.0337 0.0196 0.0384 0.0157 0.0263 0.0197 0.0186 0.0248
Q Oat  0.0195 0.0465 0.0087 0.0524 0.0365 0.0231 0.0358 0.0151 0.0222 0.0176 0.0144 0.0232
 Q CapN Crunch  0.0165 0.0683 0.0097 0.0186 0.0134 0.0089 0.0399 0.0159 0.0261 0.0207 -4.0652 0.0201
Ralston Corn Chex  0.0217 0.0539 -4.9638 0.0212 0.0148 0.0105 0.0408 0.0147 0.0244 0.0205 0.0187 0.0185
  25Table 6 A Sample of Cross-Price Elasticities across Supermarkets 


























Stop & Shop              
   K Corn Flakes  -2.4439  0.026536 0.010794 0.010114 0.015487 0.005306 0.017078 0.015112 0.012506 0.018851 0.016511 0.008716 
   GM Cheerios  0.014869  -3.7578 0.015832 0.00569 0.036441 0.007907 0.010103 0.049313 0.006965 0.011731 0.058155 0.013437 























  Shaw's 
   K Corn Flakes  0.027939  0.027087 0.010986 -2.5697 0.015866 0.005425 
   
 
0.01705 0.015547 0.004563 0.018695 0.016978 0.008886 
   GM Cheerios  0.015855  0.067083 0.015617 0.006137 -3.4781 0.00778 0.010766 0.045034 0.006847 0.012395 0.052632 0.013161 























  DeMoulas 
   K Corn Flakes  0.027345  0.028677 0.011126 0.009914 0.016601 0.005512 -2.739 0.016658 0.004657 0.018522 0.018306 0.009104
   GM Cheerios  0.013713  0.078844 0.015989 0.005292 0.038986 0.007962 0.009382 -4.2353 0.007108 0.010933 0.066833 0.013811 























  Star Market 
   K Corn Flakes  0.027095  0.029538 0.011315 0.009825 0.017031 0.005572 0.016602 0.017252 0.004735 -2.8427 0.019019 0.009225 
   GM Cheerios  0.013374  0.082102 0.015976 0.005169 0.040347 0.00796 0.009226
 
0.0587 0.007116 0.010828 -4.3027 0.013784 
   P Grape Nuts  0.018573  0.048593 0.014656 0.006982 0.026148 0.007277 0.0121 0.03108 0.006229 0.013623 0.034967 -2.9013
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  30Figure 6: Observed and Predicted Market Shares for Logit and RCM for Kellogg's Corn 
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